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Introduction 
Earnings management is a very complex and compound phenomenon in the light of 
many years of investigation. Since then numerous books and articles have been written 
and conferences held on the concept of earnings management. The subject of earnings 
management in accounting literature grew in popularity, especially during the last dec-
ade of the 20th century. It has almost become a tradition, particularly in the popular and 
business press, to discuss the subject of accounting manipulation. No doubt, earnings 
management is presented day-to-day in many of the companies which hypothesized the 
majority of the studies. However, there is no consensus related to the concept of earn-
ings management.  
Numerous papers have investigated, theoretically and empirically, different hypoth-
eses related to earnings management. Some researchers aimed simply to provide evi-
dence on earnings management; others assume that earnings management has been 
found in connection with many aspects of the company, such as its role in companies’ 
problems, financial markets, information asymmetry and agency theory, among others. 
As a consequence, an ongoing debate on the concept of earnings management is still 
present in the accounting and finance literature. This article contributes to this debate.  
Due to the wide variety and the complexity of the issue of earnings management, 
our objective is to clarify and explain the question of earnings management and support 
new insights into the key aspects of this issue by conducting a brief literature review 
from a geographical perspective. We describe in detail the concept of earnings man-
agement and ongoing debates on the issue, and we present the existing literature from 
different countries. Our investigation covers the period of 1985 to 2011 based on jour-
nals, conferences, congresses, and other publications, such as: PhD theses, Master’s 
theses, and some working papers. 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Firstly, we describe the nature 
of earnings management and the possible ways of manipulating financial information. 
We present different debates related to earnings management, such as manipulation by 
real activities or by accounting practice; manipulation within the accounting norms or 
outside the accounting norms; or the opportunistic or informative perspective of earn-
ings management.  
Secondly, taking into consideration the nature of the manipulation, we present our 
definition of earnings management, presenting the key elements of this definition. This 
section will discuss the prior definition suggesting differences between the authors’ 
points of view and their implications of the perception of earnings management.  
And finally, having defined the concept of earnings management, we focus on the 
investigation of earnings management made to date from a geographical perspective. 
 
 
1. The phenomenon of earnings management  
 
Manipulation of accounting information is a central problem for financial experts. 
A lack of transparency may lead to misunderstandings when taking decisions by the 
managers. This in turn may lead to a loss of trust and, in effect, a decrease in business 
negotiations. However, it is difficult to define earnings management because different 
authors define it in different ways. So, there are different debates on the concept of 
earnings management, see Figure 1.  
 













Source: the author.  
 
Firstly, there is a great discussion about the differences between real earnings man-
agement (in other words, affecting cash flows) and accounting practices management. 
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the best practice to increase reported earnings (see, for example, McNichols, 2000). 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines real activities manipulation as departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stake-
holders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal 
course of operations. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) state that managers are willing to 
engage in real earnings management that is costly to the firm because such actions are 
harder to detect; with the uncertainty inherent in business environments, there is no 
benchmark to determine what should have been done in any particular situation.  
An example of a proper management operating decision would be whether or not to 
implement a special discount or incentive program to increase sales near the end of 
a quarter when revenue targets are not being met. Other examples of operating deci-
sions would be whether to invest in new equipment or hire additional employees.  
Following the literature on real manipulation, such as the papers of Gunny (2005), 
Graham et al. (2005), and Roychowdhury (2006) among others, we find the following 
transactions as real earnings activities:  
− cutting R&D expenditures,  
− cutting selling,  
− general and administrative expenditures,  
− overproducing inventory to reduce the cost of goods sold,  
− selling fixed assets with a market value greater than book value to report a gain,  
− price discounts.  
From all the above possible activities, the literature underlines that most of the evi-
dence on real activities management centers on the opportunistic reduction of R&D 
expenditures to reduce reported expenses.  
The contrast group is accounting practice management. Accounting practice in-
volves management that try to „obscure” or „mask” true economic performance 
(Dechow, Skinner, 2000). An example of an accounting choice would be whether 
a company should be a voluntary early adopter of a new accounting standard or wait 
until the adoption of the new accounting standard is required of all companies. Within 
the techniques of accruals-based accounting, bases on a broad range of studies such as 
those from Dechow and Skinner (2000), Amat et al. (2003), Vander Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2003) and McKee (2005) among others, we divided them into two main 
groups: accounting practices within the accounting norms, and techniques which cross 
the boundaries of the accounting norms. In the group of accounting choices within the 
accounting norms we observe different types of managerial choices, such as:  
− overly aggressive recognition of provisions or reserves;  
− overvaluation of acquired-in-process R&D (Research and Development) in purchase 
acquisitions;  
− overstatement of restructuring charges and assets write-offs;  
− understatement of the provisions for bad debts;  
− drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly aggressive manner;  
− estimation of future obligations (called the „cookie jar reserve”);  
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− „big bath” technique: it is used in the belief that if you must report bad news, e.g. 
a loss from substantial restructuring, it is better to report it all at once and get it out 
of the way;  
− change in accounting criteria;  
− amortization, depreciation, and depletion;  
− operating versus non-operating income;  
− early retirement of debt.  
In the second group of accruals techniques of manipulation we call „techniques 
which violate accounting norms”, we have four different types of managerial choices:  
− recording sales before they are „realizable”;  
− recording fictitious sales;  
− backdating sales invoices;  
− overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory.  
Amat et al. (2003) point out that accounting regulations allow that the same transac-
tion may be accounted for in different ways, for example, the criteria for asset valuing, 
the accounting for revenues and expenses, depreciation and provisions, research and 
development, and foreign currency operations, among others. This allows the use of 
a more conservative or less conservative accounting approach according to specific 
interests.  
Focusing on the earnings management by accounting practice, we find a second de-
bate: manipulation without violating accounting rules, or crossing the boundaries of 
the rules, which may even be fraud, see Figure 2. Here we have the question: do man-
agers manipulate earnings within the accounting norms, or crossing the existing stand-
ards and principles?  
 











Source: the author.  
 
A large number of studies found that managers can exercise discretion through the 
choice of accounting methods or polices, see for example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Holthausen (1981), Bowen et al. (1981), 
Skinner (1993), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), Teoh et al. (1998), Nelson et al. 
(2002), among others.  
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Accounting standards did play an important part in the behavior of managers (García 
Osma, Gill de Albornoz, 2005), and managers use the flexibility and possibilities of 
selecting different alternatives to opt for the particular one which may secure some 
benefits. So, do rigid rules provide limited accounting options and restrict the scope for 
subjectivity judgments, and do they constrain the ability of managers to manage earn-
ings? More flexible rules may provide greater scope for choice and involve a higher 
degree of implicit subjectivity in the application of criteria, and they may allow manag-
ers a wide field in which to exercise their discretion (Jeanjean, Stolowy, 2008). They 
may use different accounting standards in their own interest in the absence of effective 
control mechanisms. So, the more flexible the rules are, the higher the possibility of 
earnings management practices is. Those accounting practices are carried out by man-
agement with the purposeful intent of manipulating the resulting figures to their ad-
vantage (Callao, Jarne, 2010). So the decrease of the scope for alternative choices of 
accounting methods can reduce the possibility of earnings management. Moreover, the 
existence of gaps in the accounting standards favours the possibility of managing earn-
ings. In presence of these gaps, managers’ opportunistic incentives generate the possi-
bility for earnings management (Gao, 2011). 
On the other hand, abuse of judgment and crossing the boundaries of the accounting 
norms can also be found in the possibility of managing earnings, and this can transform 
into the fraudulent behavior. When fraudulent reporting occurs, it is frequently perpe-
trated at levels of management above those for which internal control systems are de-
signed to be effective. It often involves using the financial statements to create an illu-
sion that the entity is healthier and more prosperous than it actually is.  
This illusion is sometimes accomplished by masking economic realities through in-
tentional misapplication of accounting principles (see for example, Conner 1986 and 
Fischer, Rosenzweig, 1995). Taking into consideration the abovementioned details, we 
may define fraud as accounting practices which are clearly meant to deceive, mislead or 
hide some financial information, and always taking into consideration crossing and not 
respecting the established accounting norms (see for example, Rocco, 1998; Dechow, 
Skinner, 2000; Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). As we can see, the main difference be-
tween fraud and non-fraudulent activity comes from following or breaking the account-
ing rules.  
And finally, we centre on the third debate found in the literature: do managers ma-
nipulate earnings only to prepare financial reports which are more effective in convey-
ing information to the users, or do they manipulate earnings to obtain some benefits and 
objectives, meaning serving the needs and expectations of the managers? The literature 
calls these two types of earnings management efficient earnings management (in other 
words, to improve earnings informativeness in communicating private information) and 
opportunistic earnings management (in other words, management reports earnings 
opportunistically to maximize their utility) (Scott, 2000).  
The opportunistic behavior perspective holds that managers take the opportunity to 
manage earnings in order to maximize their own utilities at the expense of the contracting 
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parties and stakeholders (Watts, Zimmerman, 1986). They use their discretion to max-
imize their utility, thereby managing earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). As Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) state, the purposes of opportunistic earnings management is that manag-
ers use judgment in financial reporting and in non-routine transactions to modify finan-
cial reports and attempt to mislead some shareholders about the viewpoint of the com-
pany or to affect the results of the accounting-based contract that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.  
Moreover, the perspective of opportunistic behavior takes the view that managers 
use information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders to improve their benefits in 
dealing with compensation contracts. In this way, investors are thereby misled by the 
unreliable information reported (Sun, Rath, 2008). Furthermore, the opportunistic per-
spective illustrates managers’ desire to affect wealth transfer between related contract-
ing parties and themselves. And it is related to the Positive Accounting Theory, which 
states that owners expect managers to exercise discretion toward their personal gain and 
take this into consideration when they offer managers compensation plans. When the 
value of management compensation includes the expected managerial discretions, the 
compensation contracts drive up managerial expectation and thus increase the level of 
discretions themselves (Sun, Rath, 2008).  
By contrast, the informative perspective proposes that managers exercise discretion 
in order to communicate inside information to outside investors to help investors predict 
and form expectations regarding the firm’s future performance (Holthausen, Leftwich, 
1983). Managers use their discretion to communicate private information about the 
firm’s profitability, which is yet to be reflected in the historical cost-based earnings 
(Subramanyam, 1996). The purposes of efficient earnings management is that managers 
want to communicate private information to investors, to improve the informational 
content to earnings and promote communication between managers, shareholders and 
the public (Jiraporn et al., 2008).  
A wide number of academic studies have argued that earnings management may be 
beneficial because it potentially enhances the information value of earnings. For exam-
ple, studies of Holtahusen (1990) and Healy and Palepu (1993) argue that managers 
exercise discretion over earnings to enhance earnings’ information by allowing com-
munication of private information. Moreover, Subramanyam (1996) hypothesizes that 
this managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic value. As 
a result, the stock market may rate the discretionary accruals. In the same study, 
Subramanyam (1996) also tests if current-period discretionary accruals help predict 
future cash flows, earnings, and dividends. It is expected that accruals should help pre-
dict cash flow if discretionary accruals increase the information content for current 
earnings-related future performance. He finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis, 
suggesting that discretionary accruals do add informational content to earnings. 
The existence of these two competing perspectives (that earnings management can 
be viewed as either opportunistic or beneficial) forms an important dichotomy in exam-
ining the debates surrounding this research field.  
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Once shown the notion and perception of the manipulation, it is necessary to consid-
er a key question: what is earnings management? The general aspects of this concept 
are very similar in the various definitions found in the literature. However, we may 
detect some discrepancies within the wide scope of definitions on earnings manage-
ment, for example, if earnings management is a manipulation within accounting norms, 
or crossing the boundaries of accounting rules, or earnings management is efficient or 
opportunistic, by real manipulation or by accounting policies.  
Authors contrast different aspects and characteristics of earnings management and 
use a wide range of expressions to describe the same phenomenon. Providing a com-
plete list of the definitions encountered in the literature is beyond the scope of our work 
as there is no single description of earnings management. Within the definitions found 
in the literature we may stress some of the important elements, such as:  
− it is a purposeful action of the managers, indicating the deliberate and conscious 
activity of the managers (following the definition of Schipper, 1989);  
− it is an ongoing process (related to the previous one), it means the continuing activi-
ty of the managers (Mulford, Comiskey, 1996);  
− it deals with the external aspects of the data, always regarding the reporting data of 
the firms (Healy, Wahlen, 1998);  
− it is a manipulation of the financial data of the company (GAAP definition);  
− it reaches targets to achieve the objectives and particular goals of the managers 
(Park, Shin, 2004);  
− it uses the flexibility of choosing accounting treatments and the subjectivity of the 
managers by the selecting the norms which are helpful to achieve planned results, 
opting within the possibilities of the standards (Fields et al., 2001); 
− it can result in misleading information; the presented information can pretend to hide 
or even fake some of the information (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Among the different definitions, we clearly observe the evolution of the concept of 
earnings management. We finally obtain our definition of earnings management, which 
includes these different facets of earnings management:  
Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in external financial report-
ing, to reach earnings targets, by varying the accounting practices; however, it is 
an action which takes place without violating accounting regulations, and by tak-
ing benefits from the possibility of making certain choices in the policy and ac-
counting system. This action can, but won’t necessarily, mislead stakeholders into 
believing certain financial information. 
 
 
2. Earnings management around the world  
 
The investigation on earnings management began in the U.S. and it has increased with 
time. Table 1 shows details on the studies on earnings management from the U.S. Be-
tween 2006 and 2010 we observe the intensification of the studies, reaching 49 studies 
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on earnings management based on the U.S. samples. The total number of investigations 
based on the sample from the U.S. is 98 studies, see Figure 3. 
 















*  This research identified 195 articles testing for earnings management using proxies for discretionary 
behavior. To characterize the research designs applied in our study, research for the 1985 to 2011 period 
was conducted based on journals, conferences, congresses and other publications, such as: PhD Theses, 
Master’s theses, and some working papers. For details see Appendix 1.1 which provides a reference for 
each of these articles. 
 
Source: the author. 
 
Table 1. U.S. studies on earnings management 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Healy (1985) U.S. 250 Investigates the effect of bonus schemes on ac-counting decisions.  
DeAngelo (1986) U.S. 64 Investigates the accounting decisions made by the managers of the American Stock Exchange.  
Jones (1991) U.S. 31 Tests earnings management during import relief.  
DeFond and  
Jiambalvo (1994) U.S. 94 
Examines the abnormal accruals of companies 
that reported debt covenant violations.  
Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) U.S. 1000 
Evaluates alternative accrual-based models for 
detecting earnings management.  
Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) U.S. 
64,466  
(observations) 
Provides evidence that firms manage reported 
earnings to avoid earnings.  
Key (1997) U.S. 47 Tests political costs theory by examining the cable television industry.  
Rangan (1998) U.S. 712 
Investigates whether earnings management 
around the time of the offering can explain 
a portion of the poor performance.  
Healy (1999) U.S. 179 The effect of earnings management on bonus awards.  
Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt (2003) U.S. 110 
Examines the role of the board of directors, the 
audit committee, and the executive committee in 
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Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Klein (2002) U.S. 692 
Examines whether the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals is related to audit committee independ-
ence.  
Richardson, Tuna 
and Wu (2002) U.S. 225 
Examines the usefulness of accounting infor-
mation in predicting earnings management.  
Larcker and  
Richardson (2003) U.S. 5,815 
Examines the relation between the fees paid to 
auditors for audit and non-audit services and the 
choice of accrual measures for a large sample of 
firms.  





Provides evidence that firms manipulate earnings 
so that they can round-up and report one more 
cent of earnings per share.  
Dechow, Richard-
son and Tuna (2003) U.S. 48 
Investigates whether boosting of discretionary 
accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable 
explanation for this „kink”.  
Louis (2004) U.S. 1,280 Examines the market’s efficiency in processing manipulated accounting reports. 
Guan et al. (2005) U.S. 172 Examines the discretionary accounting choices made by CEOs facing forced dismissal. 
Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) U.S. 
250 samples 
of 100 firms 
Examines the specification and power of tests 
based on performance-matched discretionary 
accruals, and make comparisons with tests using 
traditional discretionary accrual measures.  
Bergstresser and  
Philippon (2006) U.S. 4,671 
Evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced 
at firms where the CEO’s potential total compen-
sation is more closely tied to the value of stock 





Managers are manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses.  
Petrovits (2006) U.S. 323 
Examines the strategic use of corporate philan-
thropy programs to achieve financial reporting 
objectives. 
Lang, Raedy and 
Wilson (2006) U.S. 698 
Non-U.S. firms’ earnings exhibit more evidence 
of smoothing, greater tendency to manage to-
wards a target, lower association with share price 
and less timely recognition of losses. 
Koh (2007) U.S. 16,641 
Examines the association between institutional 
investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings 
management strategies in two mutually exclusive 
settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to 
meet/beat earnings targets. 
Jacob and Jorgensen 
(2007) U.S. 22,015 
Examines if earnings management is a tool to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Ye (2007) U.S. 
total number 
of observa-
tions is 75,348 
 
Shows that unexpected accruals based on the 
proposed model evince less bias and higher power 
in testing earnings management compared to 
those based on the existing models. 
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Table 1. U.S. studies on earnings management (continued) 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Byard, Hossain and 
Mitra (2007) U.S. 29 
Examines earnings management by U.S.-based oil 
companies in the period immediately after the 
impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 





Examines the agency costs of overvalued equity.  
Duh, Lee and Lin 
(2009) U.S. 55 
Examines whether the reversal of a previously 
recognized impairment loss provides an oppor-
tunity for earnings management and whether such 
behavior is associated with managers’ incentives.  
Zhang and Gimeno 
(2010) U.S. 124 
Examines the effect of pressure felt by manage-
ment to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts 
on firms’ behavior  in oligopolistic output compe-
tition.  
 
Source: the author.  
 
The investigation appeared in Europe at the end of 90s. It suggests that Europe is 
a follower of the U.S. investigators. See Table 2, the summary of studies on earnings 
management in Europe.  
We want to point out that research on earnings management in Europe has been 
done in detail in Western European countries; however, some new emerging countries 
are still unexplored. Nevertheless, earnings management in Eastern Europe is still ongo-
ing. We find only some of the studies based on the sample from Eastern European 
countries, and most of them are theoretical studies. It is obvious that the process of 
transformation, the process of globalization and fundamental changes in the economic 
and societal structures have taken place in less developed and developing countries, like 
Poland, Hungary, or other countries from the East of Europe. Consequently, further 
investigation of Eastern Europe is needed (investigations on the companies’ behavior). 
 
Table 2. European studies on earnings management 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Konings, Labro and 
Roodhooft (1998) Belgium 175 
Examines the hypothesis that in firms with strong 
trade unions, management manipulates reported 
earnings downward, compared to firms without 








Discusses the empirical evidence on earnings 
management practices by Belgian companies. 
Also the review on the influence of the larger 
boards and Big6 auditors on earnings management. 
Lybaert, Jans and 
Orens (2005) Belgium 10,418 
Examines whether Belgian companies manage 
their earnings by focusing on their policy of provi-
sions during the period 1997–2002. Concerning 
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Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
the technique of income smoothing, some proof 
has been found that companies engage in income 
smoothing by increasing or decreasing the provi-
sions.  
Kasanen, Kinnunen 
and Niskanen (1996) Finland 37 
Finds that predicted and actual earnings manage-
ment are in the same direction, and the reported 
earnings depend on the dividend-based target 
earnings  
Kallunki and 
Martikainen (1999) Finland 509 
Investigates the adjustment process of the earnings 
management of a firm to industry-wide targets 
also in Finland, where accounting and tax legisla-
tion provide extensive possibilities for firms to 
manage their earnings.  
Kinnunen et al. 
(2000) Finland 37 
Measures earnings management and expected 
dividend increases around seasoned share issues.  
Sundgren (2007) Finland 99 public and 99 private 
The paper studies earnings management in public 
and private companies and whether earnings 
management is a function of a company’s lever-
age using a matched sample with public and 
private Finnish companies.  
Jeanjean 2000 France 1383 firm-years 
Investigates the role of independent directors to 
monitor earnings management. Using a latent 
variable approach to assess earnings management, 
he shows that external monitoring of the CEO (big 
six or five auditor, significant stockholder, per-
centage of independent board members) constrain 
the manager to engage in opportunistic income 
increasing decisions. 
Cormier and  
Martinez (2006) France 118 
Investigates managers' motivations to engage in 
earnings management through purposeful inter-
ventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in 
the context of initial public offerings.  
Burghof and 
Johannsen (2006) Germany 850 
Examines whether market participants differently 
assess the information uncertainty associated with 
earnings management depending on the degree of 
income smoothing. Further hypothesis tests 
demonstrate that within a high income smoothing 
sub-sample, the differences in the degree of in-
formation uncertainty between high and low 
earnings management firm years are about half the 
size compared to a low income smoothing sub-
sample.  
Böcking et al. 
(2011) Germany 599 
Contributes to the discussion of standardized 
Europe-wide enforcement mechanisms by as-
sessing the German enforcement system.  
Caramanis and  
Lennox (2008) Greece 633 
Test the effect of audit efforts on earnings man-
agement using a unique database of hours worked 
by auditors.  
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Table 2. European studies on earnings management (continued) 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Markarian, Pozza 
and Prencipe (2008) Italy 130 
Examines whether companies' decisions to capi-
talize R&D (research and design) costs are affect-
ed by earnings-management motivations.  
Roosenbooma,  




Investigates the pattern of discretionary current 
accruals over time and examines the impact of 
earnings management on the long-run stock price 
performance of IPOs.  
Kempen (2010) Nether-lands 
77 public and 
3,105 private 
Investigates the use of earnings management in 
public and private companies.  
Kamela-Sowinska 
(2003) Poland 
Based on the 
one company Description of the case of Enron.  
Prusak (2003) Poland Theoretical research 
Treating the problem of the distortion of financial 
statements. Explaining the situation of the occur-
rence of accounting scandals. The role of the 
investor and the board in the companies in order to 
control. 
Tokarski and To-
karski (2007) Poland 
Theoretical 
research Treating the topic of creative accounting. 
Wiercińska (2008) Poland Theoretical research 
The issue of terminology connected with account-
ing frauds, which were committed by famous 
companies such as Enron, Worldcom etc., is brought 
up in the article. The author tries to explain the 
main differences between such terms as creative, 
aggressive and fraudulent accounting, which are 
often wrongly, and interchangeably used. 









Balance policy is not only the art of making what 
is possible, but also the art of making it according 
to the law. Examples of these occurrences are 
known as: creative accounting, window dressing, 
incomes smoothing, or off balance sheet financ-
ing. The aim of the article is to show that financial 
statements can be an imperfect source of infor-
mation about the financial situation of the enter-
prise and possible the negative consequences for 
potential users.  
Gierusz (2010) Poland Theoretical research 
The bankruptcy of Enron in December 2001, 
which shook the American economy and world 
public opinion, marked the beginning of a fierce 
discussion on the creative accounting. The pur-
pose of this article is to attempt to define these 
issues.  
Jackowicz and 




The article examines the importance of thresholds 
of profitability in the operation of commercial 
banks originating from the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The authors assume that the 
threshold is important, when banks take manage-
ment actions. The results of these actions are 
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Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
characteristic discontinuities in distributions prof-
itability measures around the threshold.  
Wójtowicz (2010) Poland Theoretical research 
This monograph is an attempt at a comprehensive 
look at the issue of the phenomenon known in the 
English-language literature as earnings manage-
ment. The study presents the terminology on 
earnings management. In this paper the author 
proposes that earnings management be translated 
into Polish as „shaping the financial result”.  
Matis (2010) Romania 101 
Intended to be a first step in an attempt at measur-
ing the earnings management using an economet-
ric model valid for the Romanian specificities by 
trying to establish the level of significance of three 
acknowledged econometric models: Jones (1991), 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) in the 
Romanian economic environment. Given the 
above mentioned premise, the study was conduct-














Examines the relative importance of key factors 
affecting the loan loss provisions decisions of 
Spanish depository institutions. Among others, 
they focus on the role of organizational structure. 
They specifically examine if and how loan loss 
provisions are used prior to and after the imple-
mentation of capital adequacy regulations in the 
Spanish depository industry in 1992. 
Gill-de-Albornoza 
and Illueca (2005) Spain 114 
Analyzes the effect of price regulation on the 
accounting policy of Spanish electricity compa-
nies.  
García Osma and 
Gill de Albornoz 
Noguer (2007) 
Spain 155 firm-year observations 
Tests whether corporate governance mechanisms 
promoted by best practice codes are effective in 
constraining earnings manipulation.  
Arnedo, Lizarraga 




Analyzes the difference in earnings quality be-
tween public and private firms.  




They analyze total and discretionary accruals 
around the time of labor negotiations. The „politi-
cal costs” hypothesis predicts that labor bargain-
ing creates incentives to reduce accounting earn-




Spain 45 Examines the use of stock split announcements as signals of a firm’s earnings performance.  
 
1 We have analysed in more profundity the Spanish market (papers published in English as well as in 
Spanish), which is why we have a wide sample of studies from Spain.  
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Table 2. European studies on earnings management (continued) 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 




They study the association between corporate 
governance and impression management in annual 
results press releases. Press releases constitute 
a timely vehicle to communicate a firm’s perfor-
mance to third parties that can be manipulated to 
distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achieve-
ments.  
Rodríguez-Pérez 
and van Hemmen 
(2010) 
Spain 192 
They use panel-estimation techniques to calculate 
discretionary accruals and to produce a better un-
derstanding of the nature of the relation between 
debt and earnings management. Consistent with the 
transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diver-
sification increases the complexity of firms’ activi-
ties and reduces their transparency to outsiders). 






Examines specification and power issues in relation 
to cross-sectional models used to estimate abnormal 







Focuses on the investigation of motives for, and 
characteristics of, UK firms that engage in earn-
ings management activities.  






Research whether public sector managers apply 
accounting numbers – earnings-management. They 
seek to learn about the motivations of public sector 
managers to manipulate accounting numbers and 
how managers are managing accounting numbers.  
 
Source: the author. 
 
And finally, the investigation in oriental countries appears much later (at the begin-
ning of 21st century), see Table 3. In recent years we have observed a „boom” of inves-
tigations based on the sample from Asia. From 2006 to 2010 we observed 23 research 
investigations. The total number of studies from Asia is 34.  
 
Table 3. Asian studies on earnings management 
 
Author (year) Country Number of companies Objective of the study 
Razzaque, Rahman 
and Salat (2006) 
Bangla-
desh 14 
Evaluates the earnings management in the textile 
sector.  
Lee and Xue (2004) China 329 Examines the earnings management of loss-firms during 1995-2000 in the Chinese capital market.  
Lau (2004) China 736 
Shows that using average earning per share to set 
the Initial Public Offering pricing may be an 
additional incentive for earnings management. 
The research also investigates whether the fore-
casted EPS disclosed in the prospectus or public 
announcement can be realized under different 
regulations. 
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Author (year) Country Number of companies Objective of the study 




Examines whether Chinese firms manipulate their 
earnings to meet the regulatory requirements.  
Lin (2006) China 112 
Investigates whether foreign investment enterprises 
in China alter their corporate reporting behavior in 
response to a known schedule of tax-rate increases. 
The context of this investigation is a tax-incentive 
scheme that allows firms to pay taxes at a reduced 
rate for a limited period of time, and then at 
a higher rate when this period expires.  




Indicates that Chinese firms indeed heavily en-
gaged in earnings management to meet the rights 
issue.  





Examines how local governments in China help 
listed firms in earnings management to circum-
vent central government’s regulation.  
Shen,  Coakley and 
Instefjord (2008) China 506 
Examines the under-pricing and long-term per-
formance of Chinese initial public offerings 
issued during the 1998-2003 period in the accrual 
context. While issuers use income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings prior to 
IPOs, sentiment investors do not price discretion-
ary accruals correctly but extrapolate past histo-
ries of managed earnings too far into the future.  
Kao, Wu and Yang 
(2009) China 366 
Examines whether government regulatory initia-
tives in China involving initial public offerings 
may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors 
by the issuer.  
Lo, Wong and Firth 
(2010) China 266 
Investigates whether good governance structures 
help constrain management's opportunistic behav-
iors (in the form of transfer pricing manipulations) 
in one of the world's most dynamic economies.  
Aharony, Wang and 
Yuan (2010) China 185 
Shows that related-party sales of goods and ser-
vices could be used opportunistically to manage 
earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. They 
also provide evidence that such behavior may be 
motivated by the prospect of tunneling opportuni-
ties in the post-IPO period, i.e. exploiting eco-
nomic resources from minority shareholders for 
the benefit of the parent company.  






Examines whether the establishment of audit 
committees by Hong Kong firms would constrain 
earnings management, especially in firms with 
family-dominated corporate boards.  




Investigates family control, board independence 
and earnings management 
Siregar and Utama 
(2008) Indonesia 144 
Investigates whether companies listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange conduct efficient or 
opportunistic earnings management and examines 
the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and 
corporate-governance practices on it. 
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Table 3. Asian studies on earnings management (continued) 
 
Author (year) Country Number of companies Objective of the study 
Aflatooni and 




Using the Tucker-Zarowin statistic of income 
smoothing, they find that firms with higher in-
come smoothing rankings exhibit lower long-run 





Examines choices of accounting accruals using 
a large sample of Japanese companies, which 
operate in an environment that is generally regard-
ed as being rather different from the United States.  
Otogawa (2002) Japan 828 
Investigates earnings management surrounding 
initial public offerings using Japanese firms that 
went public in the over-the-counter market be-
tween 1990 and 1999. 




Investigates the relation between discretionary 
accounting choices and executive compensation.  
Agarwal (2007) Japan 78 Measures earnings management behaviors in different economic environments.  
Yoon and Miller 
(2002) Korea 663 
Explores the relationship between the operating 
performances of industrial firms and the behavior 
of discretionary accruals.  




Using a large sample of both publicly traded and 
privately held firms in Korea, investigate whether, 
and how, the deviation of controlling sharehold-
ers’ control from ownership, business group 
affiliation, and listing status differently affect the 
extent of earnings management.  
Johl, Jubb and  




Assumes that evidence regarding audit quality 
can be derived from the level of earnings man-
agement reflected in reported abnormal or discre-
tionary accruals. Given this assumption, audit 
quality is examined in the context of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis using data from Malaysia. 
Examining audit quality in its association with 
earnings management across differential macroe-
conomic periods provides insights that may be 
otherwise masked.  
Saleh, Iskandar and 
Rahmat (2005) Malaysia 559 
Assesses the effectiveness of some board charac-
teristics to monitor management behavior with 
respect to their incentives to manage earnings.  
Rahman, Dowds and 
Cahan (2005) Malaysia 99 
Studies the differences between the earnings man-
agement practices of the Muslim-managed firms 
and the non-Muslim-managed firms listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in Malaysia.  
Ahmad-Zaluki 
(2008) Malaysia 254 
Investigates the operating performance and the 
existence of earnings management.  
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Author (year) Country Number of companies Objective of the study 
Bukit, Takiah and 
Iskandar (2009) Malaysia 155 
Examines whether high surplus free cash flow is 
related to earnings management. This study hy-
pothesizes that managers of high surplus free cash 
flow companies have an incentive to engage in 
earnings management.  
Ali Shah et al. 
(2009) Pakistan 654 
Observes the relationship between Board Compo-
sition and earnings management.  
Duh, Lee and Lin 
(2009) Taiwan 55 
Examines whether the reversal of a previously 
recognized impairment loss provides an oppor-
tunity for earnings management, and whether 
such behavior is associated with managers’ incen-
tives. They also examine whether a corporate-
governance mechanism can mitigate this behav-
ior.  
 
Source: the author.  
 
Figure 4 shows the studies based on Europe, the U.S., and Asia. It presents the num-
ber of studies along the years.  
 


















*  This research identified 203 articles testing for earnings management using proxies for discre-
tionary behavior. To characterize the research designs applied in our study, research for the 
1985 to 2011 period was conducted based on journals, conferences, congresses, and other pub-
lications, such as: PhD Theses, Master’s theses and some working papers.  
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We have not included in the previous graphic studies from South America, Africa or 
Australia, as we have observed a very small number of studies from these regions, see 
details on these studies in the Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Details on studies on earnings management in North and South America and 
Australia 
 
Panel A. North and South American studies on earnings management 
 
Author (year) Country Number  of companies Objective of the study 
Park and Shin 
(2004) Canada 539 
Investigates the role of the board by investigating the 
effect of board composition on the practice of earnings 
management in Canada. They find that earnings are 
managed upward to avoid reporting losses and earn-
ings declines. 
Martinez 
(2005) Brazil Theoretical 
Presents empirical evidence that Brazilian public 
companies practice earnings management as a re-
sponse to capital market incentives.  
Feres de 
Almeida et al. 
(2005) 
Brazil 156 
Investigates earnings management activities of Brazil-
ian firms, after the Enron and WorldCom accounting 
scandals, which brought new attention to the quality of 









Investigates the impact of cross listing and of adjust-
ments to U.S. GAAP on the earnings management 
practices of Brazilian firms. The institutional envi-
ronment in Brazil is characterized by poor investor 
protection and uninformative accounting numbers. In 
this environment firms with better prospects could try 
to opt out of the country’s poor institutional environ-
ment and to commit themselves to superior govern-
ance systems by cross-listing in the U.S. 
 
Panel B. Australian studies on earnings management 
 
Author (year) Country Number of companies Objective of the study 
Koh (2003) Australia 836 
Examines the association between institutional owner-
ship and Australian firms’ aggressive earnings man-





Examines whether managers manage earnings to ‘just 
meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous 
Australian studies on benchmark-beating have focused 
on loss avoidance and small earnings increases as 
benchmarks.  
 
Source: the author. 
 
 





As we may see, ongoing debates are observed on the topic of earnings management, 
such as: real or accruals manipulation; efficient or opportunistic perspective on earnings 
management; manipulation within accounting rules or crossing the boundaries of ac-
counting principles.  
There is currently no consensus on the concept of earnings management. Each au-
thor, depending on his position on the above statements or research scope, specifies and 
details the definition of the concept stressing the aspects which he tackles in the investi-
gation.   
A short revision of the recent studies on earnings management indicates the exist-
ence of manipulation in the accounting numbers in companies. Moreover, in the light of 
corporate scandals (such as: Enron, WorldCom, Tico) there is no doubt that the credi-
bility of present financial reporting is being questioned. Even more, a study executed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (DiPiazza, Eccles, 2002) reveals that only 20% of the analysts, 
investors and executives consider that information prepared under the present account-
ing norms is very useful to know the true image of a company.  
We may conclude that the practice of earnings management is a phenomenon which 
was presented in the past and are still observed at present in the companies’ environ-
ment. However, the research on earnings management has progressed over the last 
twenty five years. We observe a major intensification of studies between 2006 and 
2010. Moreover, in the previous five years (2001–2005) the tendency to improve on the 
research into earnings management was also observed. Moreover, U.S. studies still 
persist as a leader in this topic. Almost 50% of all studies done within our sample peri-
od are from the U.S.  
Taking into consideration all the debates presented above, and the fields of research 
observed during last twenty five years, we may still observe possible lines of investiga-
tions. As we mentioned earlier, most of the studies from Eastern Europe are rather theo-
retical studies. So we think it could be interesting to carry out a study on earnings man-
agement in these countries, after globalization and the fundamental changes in their 
economic and society, to know if earnings management exists and what the possible 
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Earnings management has received considerable attention in the accounting literature. However some 
aspects and environments are still unexplored. We present the debates on this subject: real transactions or 
accounting practices, respecting the rules or crossing the boundaries, efficient or opportunistic earnings 
management. Based on diligent investigation of more than two hundred papers, we present the evolution of 
the earnings management concept and present our own definition. Finally, we conduct a literature review on 
earnings management from a geographical perspective.  
 




Dyskusja na temat zarządzania zyskiem: perspektywa geograficzna  
Zarządzanie zyskiem (earnings management) od dłuższego czasu jest przedmiotem studiów literaturowych 
z zakresu rachunkowości. Prowadzone na ten temat bardzo liczne badania wykazują, że niektóre aspekty 
zarządzania zyskiem wciąż pozostają nie do końca wyjaśnione. W niniejszym artykule autorzy przedstawia-
ją dyskusję na temat zarządzania zyskiem. Poruszają w nim kilka zagadnień. Po pierwsze, czy kształtowa-
nie zysków dotyczy decyzji z zakresu działalności operacyjnej, czy może decyzji z zakresu rachunkowości 
(praktyki rachunkowości). Po drugie, czy zarządzanie zyskiem ma na celu prezentację zdarzeń gospodar-
czych w sposób sprzeczny z zasadami rachunkowości, czy też może w ramach jej przepisów. I wreszcie po 
trzecie, czy zarządzanie zyskiem wiąże się z efektywnym funkcjonowaniem przedsiębiorstwa, czy tylko 
z oportunistycznym dostosowaniem do istniejących warunków. Na podstawie systematycznej i starannej 
analizy ponad dwustu artykułów autorzy przedstawiają również ewolucję terminu zarządzania zyskiem 
i prezentują własną jego definicję. Ponadto dokonują szerokiego przeglądu literatury z perspektywy geogra-
ficznej.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: zarządzanie zyskiem, rachunkowość, przegląd literatury, perspektywa geograficzna. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

